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NOTES
Fisher demonstrates that exemplary damages may compound damages
awarded to a plaintiff for mental suffering if the plaintiff is also allowed
compensation for mental suffering.
Harriet E. Miers
Parental Immunity No Defense for the Negligent Driver
The automobile which Mrs. Hebel was driving collided with a truck-
trailer, and her daughter was injured. The minor child, through her father
as next friend, brought a negligence action against her mother seeking
compensation for the injuries. In the trial court, Mrs. Hebel moved for
summary judgment on the ground that a minor cannot sue his parent for
negligence. The trial court denied the motion, and an appeal was made to
the Supreme Court of Alaska. Held, affirmed: Because of the wide preva-
lence of automobile liability insurance, an unemancipated minor can bring
an action against his parent for personal injuries sustained as a result of
the parent's negligent driving. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY IMMUNITIES IN TORT ACTIONS
Intra-family immunities developed as a result of legally recognized rela-
tionships, duties, and responsibilities. At English common law suits could
not be maintained between spouses since they were "one and the same per-
son."' However, there was no common law concept of legal unity of the
parent and child.' Suits by child against parent could be maintained in real
property actions,3 but there was no English authority allowing or denying
parental immunity from tort actions. The English view of interspousal im-
munity found its way to the United States.! Parental immunity, although
not a common law concept, developed in the United States as a result of the
courts' desire to protect the peace and harmony of the family unit.
Parental immunity from tort actions was first announced in Hewellette
v. Georges in 1891. There the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a minor
could not maintain an action for false imprisonment against her mother
who had maliciously confined her in an insane asylum. The court based this
decision on a public policy-the need to protect the peace and harmony
of the family-rather than on a theory of the family as a legal entity.
'Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q.B.D. 436, 439 (1876).
2 For a discussion of the common law background, see Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Be-
tween Members of the Family-Husband d Wife-Parent &. Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 153, 180-83
(1961); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031-35,
1056-57 (1930).
'See Akers & Drummond, supra note 2, at 180.
4 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).
568 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
"The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, de-
signed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent." Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
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Later, in McKelvey v. McKelvey,' the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to
allow a minor to sue the parents for cruel and inhuman treatment. Relief
was denied on the same grounds relied upon in Hewellette. In 1905 the
trilogy on which the doctrine of parental immunity is based was com-
pleted with the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Roller v.
Roller.' In that case the court barred the minor's suit against her father,
who had raped her, because of the need to protect the peace of society and
the families composing society. Although the court recognized that the
Roller family harmony had already been destroyed, it expressed the fear
that once such suits were allowed, there would be no practical way of de-
termining which to allow and which to deny.' From this base the doctrine
of parental immunity was almost uniformly applied in every jurisdiction
which ruled on the question until the 1930's.'°
In denying the minor the right to maintain a tort action against his
parent, the courts have relied primarily on four policy arguments. One ar-
gument is that such a suit will deplete the family's financial resources.1 Un-
less the parent is insured, the effect is to take funds from the parent and
place them with the child at the expense of a lawsuit. Secondly, if the par-
ent has liability insurance, there is the possibility of collusive suits. 2 A third
objection is that suits brought by the child against the parent interfere
with parental control and discipline." The fourth and most frequently
cited objection is that such an action disrupts the peace and harmony of
the family.14
II. DEVELOPMENT OF EXCEPTIONS TO FAMILY IMMUNITIES IN
TORT ACTIONS
The present trend of the courts reflects a chipping away of the general
doctrine of family immunities. Nineteen states have done away with inter-
spousal immunity in tort actions." And, while only one state has totally
abrogated the rule of parental immunity from tort actions," exceptions
have been carved into that doctrine. For example, some jurisdictions have
allowed the minor to maintain an action for personal injuries willfully or
intentionally inflicted' and for injuries caused by reckless or grossly negli-
7111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
837 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
'Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
"0 For an extensive list of cases by jurisdiction, see Akers & Drummond, supra note 2, at 182
n.162 (1961).
"Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
"Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
"s Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Rodebaugh v. Grand Trunk W.R.R.,
4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1966); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d
236 (1942).
'"Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 IU. 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954),
error ref.
"See W. PROSSrR, LAW oF TORTS § 116, at 885 (3d ed. 1964) for a list of the nineteen states
with cases and statutes in point.
'
5 Briere v. Bricre, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
17See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 451 (1951).
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gent conduct.18 Exceptions have been made when the parent was not acting
in a parental capacity but rather in his business or vocational capacity."
Injuries which occurred while the parent and child were standing in a spe-
cial relationship such as master-servant' or carrier-passenger" have been
made the basis of exceptions. In some cases which have made exceptions to
the rule of parental immunity for negligently inflicted torts, the courts
have relied heavily on the presence of insurance to negate the reasons which
are given for barring the action."
The first significant attack on the rule of parental immunity came in
1930 with the decision by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Dun-
lap v. Dunlap.' There the court allowed the minor to sue his father for in-
juries inflicted while the son was employed by the father. The Dunlap court
did not limit its decision to the master-servant situation, deciding that the
inability of the child to sue is not absolute and exists only where the suit
might disturb family relations.' Since this danger is not present when li-
ability is transferred to an insurer, the court concluded that the immunity
did not apply where the parent was insured.
In 1954 the New Hampshire court overruled Dunlap insofar as it would
allow a suit on the basis of insurance," reasoning that the existence of liabil-
ity insurance cannot create a right of action where none would otherwise
exist.0 However, in 1966 the court again reversed itself, 7 completely abro-
gating the rule of parental immunity. In allowing the minor to maintain an
action against his father for injuries sustained in an automobile accident,
the New Hampshire court reasoned that the only substantial basis for deny-
ing the minor the right to sue his parent is the need to maintain parental
authority and family peace. The prevalence of insurance was relied upon by
the court to negate this argument and was a major consideration in the de-
cision to do away with the "court made rule"'" of parental immunity.
Although New Hampshire is the only state which has completely elimin-
ated the defense of parental immunity in tort actions, Wisconsin has made
a significant exception to the parental immunity rule. In Goller v. White"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed an action by a foster son against his
foster father for injuries sustained by the son while he was riding on a trac-
tor operated by the foster father on a public highway. The rule established
in Goller was that parental immunity bars negligence actions only where
the negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child,
"'See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 11 n.23 (Alas. 1967), and cases cited therein.
"9Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
" Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
22Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150
A. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
2384 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
24 150 A. at 915.
"sLevesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
2" 106 A.2d at 564.
23Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
20224 A.2d at 590.
2920 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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or the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to such things
as food, clothing, housing, and other items of parental care. In making this
change in the law of parent-child immunity, the court aligned itself with
a group of cases which have argued that insurance tends to negate any dis-
ruption of family harmony and discipline."
III. HEBEL V. HEBEL
The decision in Hebel to abolish parental immunity in the automobile
negligence situation reflects the role of insurance in the development of ex-
ceptions to the general rule of parental immunity. The Hebel court reviewed
the four major policy reasons for barring an action by the child against the
parent 1 and systematically rejected each, relying heavily on the theory that
if insurance is present, these arguments are no longer valid. The argument
that such a suit will ultimately decrease family financial resources was
countered with the argument that there is no decrease of the family finan-
cial resources when the burden of the suit is shifted to an insurer." In addi-
tion, the presence of insurance is assumed in the argument that intra-family
suits will encourage fraudulent and collusive actions. The Hebel court ob-
served that the danger of fraud and collusion is present in all liability insur-
ance cases and thus is reason, not for denial of a cause of action, but for
added caution on the part of the court and jury in examining the facts."
In rejecting the arguments that suits by minor child against parent inter-
fere with parental discipline, the court reasoned that if insurance is present,
there is small possibility that parental discipline will be undermined.' Simi-
lar reasoning was used by the court to counter the argument that intra-
family suits have a damaging effect on domestic harmony.
The decision in Hebel was not limited to automobile accident cases in
which insurance is present." The court concluded that although the exist-
ence of liability insurance does not create liability,' the wide prevalence
of automobile liability insurance was a proper element to consider in the
policy decision of whether to continue the rule of parental immunity in
the automobile negligence situation. Since insurance is widely prevalent in
automobile cases, the court viewed the continuation of parental immunity
in this area as unrealistic, 7 regardless of whether the parent in a particular
instance is covered by insurance. However, the court did not define the
scope which it will now give to parental immunity, but rather limited its
decision to the facts of the case before it. Thus, the Alaska rule of parental
immunity was changed only to the extent that a minor who sustains in-
juries as a result of the parent's negligent driving may now maintain an
action against the negligent parent.
30122 N.W.2d at 197.
" For a discussion of the reasons for barring an action by the child against the parent, see text
accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
"Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 13 (Alas. 1967).
5
'id. at 12.
34 id. at 1,





Although in Hebel the decision was not limited to automobile accident
situations in which the parent is insured, the rationale of the court is per-
suasive only where insurance is in fact present. The court appeared to as-
sume that no suit will be brought unless insurance is present." However, if
in a case similar to Hebel the record revealed the absence of liability insur-
ance, the court's reasoning, that the general availability and wide preva-
lence of automobile insurance negates the principal arguments for barring
the action, would be both unconvincing and contradictory. If the reasons
for barring an action by the child are valid, the general availability of in-
surance is no argument for the abrogation of parental immunity. Unless
the parent is insured, a recovery by the child would deplete the family
finances. When the burden of the suit falls on the parent rather than on the
insurance company, there is likely to be disruption of domestic harmony
and parental discipline. The better view of insurance in such cases seems
to be that the "existence or non-existence of insurance must be considered
irrelevant . . . ."" Although Hebel is one more authority in the trend away
from family immunities, it is not likely to have a significant influence in
other jurisdictions."
The courts should make a frontal attack on the reasons given for barring
an action by the minor against the parent. Domestic harmony is not a valid
consideration where the parent has falsely imprisoned,' raped,- or used
cruel and inhuman treatmentS against the child. A minor who receives in-
juries due to the negligence of a parent should not be denied recovery for
injuries which may last beyond minority. The reasons which underlie par-
ental immunity shoud be re-examined, and more emphasis should be placed
on the need to protect the personal security of the minor child.
Glen A. Majure
Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants: A Post-Gideon View
Borst, a candidate for sheriff in Minnesota, issued a circular regarding
the qualifications of his opponent and was charged with violating a Minne-
sota statute' which makes it a misdemeanor knowingly to publish a false
statement about a candidate for public office. Borst was arraigned and re-
quested a continuance to enable him to retain counsel. Later he appeared
without counsel and requested appointment of one, claiming he was finan-
38 1d. at 12.
"
9 Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Iowa 1968).
4 Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1968), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa
barred a negligence action by a minor against his father, rejecting reasoning similar to that in
Hebel.
4'Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
41 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.08 (1962).
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